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Abstract 
We examine the impact of major tax legislation on business capital investment 
during the 1980-88 period. We detail the tax changes and imbed them into a neo­
classical rental price of capital goods. 
We then use this rental price in two popular models of business fixed 
investment, a standard and a modified neo-classical model. We estimate these two 
models along with an accelerator model of capital investment. The models, in 
general, exhibit parameter instability regardless of fit. We then develop a model 
incorporating expected delivery lags for new capital goods and embed a forecasted 
output and the rental price of capital services. Again, parameter instability and 
fit are examined. 
Finally we conduct simulations of tax, price and output shocks. We conclude 
that the new model has parameter stability, and that the net effect of Reagan's tax 
policies was small. 
i 
I. Introduction 
The Reagan administration carried out a series of major legislative changes in 
tax incentives affecting business fixed investment that has been perceived by casual 
observers as both favorable and unfavorable to American businesses. 1 The question 
of the overall quantitative impact on investment naturally arises. If this question 
is to be answered, the first requirement is agreement on the best model relating the 
decisions of businesses to make capital investments to the presumed determinants. 
This paper examines contending models, and then essays an answer to the quantitative 
issue. 
A number of studies have compared investment equations developed in the 1960s 
and 1970s. 2 These studies show that equations purporting to explain postwar 
investment spending are notable for their parameter instability and/or their 
inability to provide accurate ex-post forecasts beyond the sample period. 
In this paper we focus on one plausible explanation for this instability, the 
one suggested by Lucas [1976], in what has become known as the Lucas Critique. Lucas 
noted that endogenous economic time series often depend on the decisions of policy-
makers or on other forces which may be modeled as exogenous. A regime change occurs 
when the policy-making process changes or when the exogenous forces change. If an 
economic decision-maker must forecast the dependent series in order to make his 
decision, he will have to use different forecasting equations before and after the 
1 Throughout this paper we will refer to the Reagan tax program as if President 
Reagan alone shaped it. Congress, of course, also had a role in the legislation. 
2 See Bischoff, [1971b], Clark [1979], Kopcke, [1977 , 1982, 1985], and 
Bernanke, et al., [1988]. 
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change, if his forecasts are to be rational. This implies that model builders should 
expect the parameters of their lag functions to vary when regimes change. 
In what follows, we first outline how taxes are introduced into the various 
models, then review the Reagan tax initiatives with this in mind. Next we discuss 
several models and report the results of estimation using quarterly data through 
1988. We then posit a new model recognizing the influence of regime changes and fit 
the model to the same data. We next evaluate the quantitative impact of the tax 
initiatives of President Reagan's tenure, and finally draw conclusions. 
II. The Rental Price of Capital Services 
The centerpiece of the neoclassical theory of investment behavior is the rental 
price of capital services denoted by the letter c, which represents the rental price 
capital goods could command in a perfect market. In the presence of taxes, the 
rental price may be written as: 
(2.1) c - q (6 + r)(l - uz - k)/(l - u). 
Here, q denotes the price of new capital goods, 6 the rate of economic decay of 
capital, r the after tax real interest rate, u the rate of taxation of business 
income, z the present discounted value of the stream of depreciation deductions from 
a dollar's worth of capital goods,3 and k the rate of investment tax credit. 
In this paper, we will frequently specify equations as if the desired ratio of 
capital to output is proportional to the ratio pic, where p is the price of output. 
This ratio is the inverse of the real rental price of capital. This specification 
may be derived theoretically from the assumption of a Cobb-Douglas production 
3 With the basis adjusted for any deduction of part or all of the investment tax 
credit. 
2 
. function. However, even if the desired capital-output ratio is specified 
proportional to pic, this does not guarantee that the estimated price elasticity of 
the investment or capital stock with respect to the inverse of the real rental will 
be unity. If the equation contains an intercept, and also if the actual capital stock 
appears in a gross investment equation with a free coefficient, almost any estimated 
price elasticity may result. 
In this paper, investment is disaggregated into two major asset groups: 
producers' durable equipment, denoted E, and non-residential structures, denoted 
S. The estimates of 0, k, and z, are weighted averages of these variables for 20
 
different types of equipment and 14 types of structures. 4 The real discount rate for
 
equipment, r" is given as:
 
(2.2) r, - «2RB - pe) + RD) (l-hu).
 
Here RB is Moody's Industrial bond yield, RD is a splicing of Moody's and Standard
 
and Poor's Industrial dividend price ratios, pe is the expected rate of price change
 
derived in Ando et. al. [1974J, u is the combined rate of corporate tax by federal,
 
state and local governments, and h is the proportion of debt in the corporate capital
 
structure. The formula for r s ' the real discount rate for structures, is given as:
 
(2.3) r - 2RD(1 - hu).5s 
III. President Reagan's Investment Tax Policies 
Five major pieces of tax legislation which directly affected the rental price 
of capital services were passed during President Ronald Reagan's two administrations. 
4 The disaggregated details for these estimates come from Hulten and Wykoff 
[1981], Jorgenson and Sullivan [198lJ, Fullerton and Henderson [1984J, Fullerton, 
Gillette, and Mackie [1987J, and Fullerton, Henderson and Mackie [1987J. 
5 Bischoff [197lbJ used both of these formulas.
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Of course, the impact of Reagan's tax policies on business investment was not limited 
to direct effects through the rental price of capital. Other major tax and non-tax 
policies clearly affected demand and output, and had effects on investment via these 
channels. Also, Reagan's fiscal policies affected interest rates, which indirectly 
affected the rental price. These effects, however, are beyond the scope of this 
paper. 
The first piece of Reagan tax legislation was the Economic Recovery Tax Act 
(ERTA) of 1981, which shortened the lifetimes to be used to depreciate equipment and 
structures for tax purposes. We model this shortening of lives as decreasing the 
weighted average lifetime for equipment, which we calculate to move from 7.947 years 
to 4.858 years, and the weighted average lifetime for structures, calculated to move 
from 20.303 years to 12.021 years. 6 ERTA also changed the patterns by which these 
assets could be depreciated. We model these changes by assuming that before ERTA , 
14% of equipment investment was depreciated by straight-line methods, 43% by doub1e­
declining-balance with switch to straight-line, and 43% by sum-of-the-years' digits. 
After ERTA , all equipment investment was depreciated by 150%-dec1ining-ba1ance with 
switch to straight-line. Similarly, before ERTA it is assumed that 14% of structures 
investment was depreciated by straight-line methods and 86% by 150%-declining-ba1ance 
with switch to straight-line, whereas after ERTA all structures investment was 
depreciated by 175%-dec1ining-ba1ance with switch to straight-line. ERTA increased 
the tax credit for autos, trucks, buses, and trailers. ERTA also instituted the 
Safe-Harbor Leasing method, by which unused investment tax credits could be shifted 
between firms. We model these two provisions, by changing the effective rate of tax 
6 These and the other underlying calculations in this section were done by 
applying the tax changes to specific asset classes as appropriate, and by aggregating 
the classes to obtain an overall effect for equipment and structures. 
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credit for equipment from 8.50% in 1980 to 9.80% in 1981. Of this rise, 0.32% is 
due to the increase for vehicles. Similarly, the effective rate of tax credit on 
structures is increased from 2.52% to 2.80%. 
The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act (TEFRA) of 1982 changed several 
of these provisions. The basis for depreciation of both equipment and structures 
is modeled as reduced by 50% of the effective rate of tax credit. Safe-Harbor­
Leasing was effectively repealed. This is modeled as reducing the effective 
investment tax credit rate to 8.82% for equipment and 2.52% for structures. 
Further tax changes in the first quarter of 1984 increased our measure of the 
weighted average depreciation lifetime for structures from 12.021 years to 13.087 
years; another increase during the second quarter of 1985 increased it to 13.401 
years. 
Finally, the Tax Reform Act of 1986 made three major changes. The investment 
tax credit was repealed. The maximwn federal tax rate on corporate income was 
lowered from 46% to 34%. Depreciation changes also were made. After the tax reform 
act, we model all equipment investment depreciation as doub1e-dec1ining-ba1ance with 
switch to straight-line, and 61.016% of structures investment depreciation as 
straight-line, 22.877% as 150%-dec1ining-ba1ance, and 16.107% as doub1e-dec1ining­
balance. The weighted average depreciation lifetime for equipment investment is 
increased from 4.858 to 6.545 years, while for structures investment the increase 
is from 13.401 to 17.434 years. 
Between the fourth quarter of 1980, or 1980:4, and 1988:4, we find the real 
rental price of capital service, c/p, fell from 0.329 for equipment and 0.182 for 
structures to 0.283 for equipment and 0.112 for structures. The drop for structures 
occurred because the discount rate for structures is based heavily on the stock 
market. The present value of the depreciation deduction for equipment rose from 
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0.601 to 0.689; for structures the rise was from 0.314 to 0.532. The repeal of the 
investment tax credit counteracts these increases. 
Turning to individual pieces of legislation, the changes from ERTA in 1981 
directly reduced our calculated rental price (rent) for equipment by 7.25%, and for 
structures by 11.34%. TEFRA, in 1982, raised equipment rent by 3.96% and structures 
rent by 0.82%. The 1984 and 1985 laws increased structures rentals by 1.66% and 
0.46%, respectively. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 pushed up equipment rent by 15.51% 
by repealing the investment tax credit and 0.68% by depreciation changes. The same 
two shifts increased structures rentals by 3.92% and 7.56% respectively. The cut 
in corporate tax rates reduced equipment rent by 6.66% and structures rent by 8.80%. 
Computing the real rental price of capital services for 1988:4, but using all of the 
1980:4 tax parameters, we calculate that the Reagan changes raised the rental price 
for equipment by 2.71% but lowered the rental price for structures for 8.43%. The 
rest of the changes in real rentals noted in the last paragraphs were due to changes 
in relative prices, in real discount rates, and in nominal discount rates. 
IV. Traditional Models of Investment Expenditure 
Three popular models of business fixed investment are analyzed in this section. 
Two are versions of the neoclassical model; the third, the accelerator model, is 
one in which tax policy plays no direct role through a rental price of capital term. 
Each of the three models is applied to data on two components of real nonresidential 
fixed investment: producers' durable equipment and nonresidential structures. 7 
7 Tobin's "Q" model, based on the ratio of market value to the replacement cost 
of capital, was excluded because of the absence of an accepted theory relating tax 
changes to equity and bond prices. 
6 
A. The Generalized Accelerator Models 
As first formulated by J.M. Clark [1917], the accelerator model postulated a 
proportional relationship between net investment and the change in output. Later, 
flexible accelerator models allowed for partial adjustment of capital stock by making 
net investment a linear function of the deviation between current output and existing 
capital stock. In some variants, current output was replaced by expected output. 
We allow for both the formation of expectations and partial adjustment by estimating 
the parameters of two long lag distributions on levels and on changes in output. 
Our accelerator equations are given as: 
Zl (4.1) Xt - A1 + 1i-1 MliQt-i + D1Kt + Ult , and 
Zl 
(4.2) ~ - Az + 1iz1 MZi l1Qt-i + DZKt + UZt ' 
Here, X' - [E S] where E represents quarterly seasonally adjusted expenditures on 
producers' durable equipment in billions of 1982 dollars, and S represents quarterly 
seasonally adjusted expenditures on nonresidential structures in billions of 1982 
dollars, Q denotes quarterly seasonally adjusted business gross national product in 
billions of 1982 dollars. l1Qt-i represents the change in Q, Qt-i - Qt-i-1' The vector 
K' - [KE KS] denotes the stocks of equipment and structures at the beginning of 
period t, computed using the geometric mortality distribution and data from U.S. 
Department of Commerce [1987] extending back to 1832 for structures and 1877 for 
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equipment. 8 The terms A and D and the twenty-one terms in M are vectors of 
parameters and the U's are vectors of error terms. 9 
The parameters were estimated using Almon [1965] polynomial distributed lags. 
The 21 quarter lags were chosen to approximate five-year lags used by Clark [1979]. 
However, unlike Clark, we used no current right-hand variables in any equation in 
this paper. In all cases, third-degree polynomials with no zero restriction are 
used. Thus, each equation in (4.1) and (4.2) had seven parameters to be estimated: 
the intercept, four parameters for the lag distribution, the coefficient of capital 
stock, and the autoregressive parameter. 
B. The Standard Neoclassical Models 
Jorgenson's [1965] standard neoclassical model is also fitted in levels and 
first differences versions given as: 
21 (4.3) Xt, - A3 + L-1 M3i [(P/C)t-i Qt-i] + D3~ + U3t , and 
21 (4.4) Xt - A4 + L-1 M4i [to[ (P/c)t-i Qt-d] + D4~ + U4t · 
The variables and parameters are as defined above. 
8 All variables, including the intercept, are divided by Gordon's [1987] version 
of natural real Gross National Product (GNP), following Clark [1979], as a 
heteroskedasticity correction. 
9 Each vector U has elements which we denote by v's. Each v is assumed to be 
a first order autoregressive processes with v t-pVt -1 + et . 'We used the Beach­
MacKinnon [1978] maximum likelihood algorithm to estimate the equations. Below, we 
will refer to sv' which is an estimate of the square root of the variance of v, and 
se which is an estimate of the square root of the variance of e. Note that the 
structures and equipment equations were estimated separately. 
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C. The Modified Neoclassical Models 
The modified neoclassical equations which are based on the putty-clay model are 
a bit different. The idea behind these equations is that changes in capital 
intensity can only take place when gross additions to capacity are already 
occurring. 10 Thus, in the quasi-difference version of this equation each lagged term 
For comparison to the other equations we fitted 
a levels equation for equipment given as: 
21 21 
(4.5) Et - A5 + L.1 M5i [(P!C)t-i-1 Qt-d + L.1 N5i [(P!c)t-i-1 Qt-i-d + D5K5 + U5t · 
We also fitted a differences version: 
21 (4.6) Et - A6 + L.1 M6i [(P!c)t-i-1 tlQt-d + D6Kt + U6t · 
Finally, we fitted a quasi-differences version: 
21 (4.7) Et - A7 + L.1 M7i [(P!C)t-i-1 IQt-i - (1 - c5)Qt-i-1)] + D7Kt + Un' 
The putty-clay paradigm seems less applicable to structures, and empirical 
results bear this out. The modified neoclassical structures equation is simply a 
standard neoclassical equation with pic raised to the power 0.5. 11 
10 See Bischoff [197la]. 
11 See Bischoff [1970]. 
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D.. Estimation Results of Contending Models 
Summary statistics for equations (4.1) through (4.7) are contained in Table I, 
and parameter stability tests results are given in Table 2. The .ample period for 
all equations in Table 1 is from 1953:1 through 1988:4. The modified neoclassical 
levels equation appears the best among the equipment equations shown in Table 1. 
All of the other equations have only seven parameters, while this one has eleven, 
but the statistics s. and sv' are adjusted for degrees of freedom. 
The variation between the best and worst s. statistic for equipment is less 
than 12%. Two of the three versions of the modified neoclassical equation fit best 
by this statistic and the standard neoclassical equations are worst. For sv' the 
variation is greater but the ordering is the same. There is substantial serial 
correlation of residuals in all equations as evidenced by the value of rho. 
The picture for structures is different, as all equations are the same in terms 
of se' and the range in Sv is less than 16%. The accelerator equations are best by 
the second measure. The serial correlation is worse, and the Durbin-Watson 
statistics indicate that a first-order autoregressive process may not be general 
enough. 
The likelihood ratio tests of stability in Table 2 confirm our earlier doubts 
about the stability of time series investment equations. The null hypothesis for 
each of the tests reported in Table 2 is that all parameters, and the variance of 
the error e, are constant across all subperiods. If the null hypothesis is true the 
test statistic asymptotically will be distributed as a chi-square variate with A 
degrees of freedom. For all equations except the modified neoclassical equation in 
levels, the parameter A is equal to 8, except for the test in the third column, where 
10 
A is 16. For the modified neoclassical equation in levels, A is equal to 12, except 
for the third test where it is 24. 
The best-fitting equipment equation, the modified neoclassical equation in 
levels, fails every stability test at least at the .01 significance level. But the 
performance of the other equations is not much better. Only the standard 
neoclassical equipment equation, in differences form, with the worst se and sV' 
emerges unscathed. Every other equation rejects the null hypothesis for at least 
three of the tests. Of course, these tests are not independent of one another, but 
the impression of instability is strong. Things are no better for structures. For 
every equation except one, the null hypothesis is rej ected for at least three 
divisions of the sample. For that one equation the null hypothesis is rej ected when 
the sample is split at the end of 1980. 
We are left with a situation in which we must project the effects of the Reagan 
tax policies either with an equation that fits very badly and can be rejected on the 
basis of comparative fit. or an equation which exhibits parameter instability, 
especially around the Reagan inauguration. 12 Alternatively, we can try to find a 
different equation that is stable. 
V. A New Model of Expectations and Investment 
Changing expectations may enter the investment process if there is a lag between 
the placement of orders and deliveries of capital goods. Even if adjustment costs 
are zero, so that investment decisions do not lock producers in beyond the delivery 
12 Chirinko [1988] studied the effect of the "Reagan Revolution" on the 
forecasts of four models explaining business fixed investment. He found (p. 209) 
that "these investment equations considered as a whole do not show any signs of 
important structural instability." Chirinko' s methods for testing for stability 
differ considerably from ours, and we have not attempted to reconcile our results 
with his. 
11 
lag, expectations over this period are important. Between the different policy 
regimes, measured variables may have differing relationships to expected variables. 
In the putty-clay model the commitment by firms is considerably longer as factor 
proportions are fixed for as long as the equipment is in place. In both cases, the 
Lucas Critique clearly is relevant. We develop models which deal with these 
concerns. 
Consider a simple accelerator model with zero adjustment cost but with a fini te, 
distributed, time-to-build lag between the time orders are placed for investment 
goods and the time the goods become productive. Suppose that each industry uses a 
different kind of capital good, for which the lag is discrete, and that the output 
of each industry is a fixed fraction of aggregate output. Assume that all industries 
have the same technologically fixed capital-output ratio and that an efficient market 
for second-hand assets exists. 
Under these conditions, the decision on how much output the jth firm wishes to 
produce in period t completely determines the firm's orders for capital goods in 
period t - Lj , where Lj denotes the time-to-build lag for the jth firm. At time 
t - Lj we assume that the firm makes a rational forecast of its output, then orders 
enough investment goods so that, given necessary replacement and previous orders, 
it will later have enough capital stock to produce that expected output. Formally, 
let V be the capital-output ratio for all firms .13 Then new orders, NO, for 
expansion investment by firm j are given by: 
e	 e 
(5.1)	 NOj,t - V{(Qj,t+L. I 0t-1) - (Qj,t+L-1.1 °t-Z)} , 
J J 
13 The assumption that all industries have the same capital-output ratio may 
be relaxed with no change in the results. 
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where 0t is the information set at time t and where we assume a one-quarter 
information lag. As before, the superscript e denotes expectations. 
If the proportion of investment carried out by firms with lead time L is WL, 
then the proportion of output produced by those firms also is WL. Let the maximum 
lead time be m. Aggregate net investment, NI, may then be written as: 
m e e (5.2) NIt - 1.-0 WLV{ (Qt I 0t-L-l) - (Qt-l I 0t-L-2)' 
Now suppose that between period t and period t+l there is a change in the 
process of generating Qe. All orders placed in periods up to t would be based on 
forecasts generated under the old process. All orders placed in t+l and afterwards 
would be based on the new process, assuming knowledge of the new process is 
disseminated immediately. For a few periods there is an ambiguity about what initial 
conditions should be used to start up the new forecasts. We assume that actual 
e 
output under the old process is used here. Let (Q old . .m, be the 
tTi 
forecasts of output under the old process. Then if WL, L - 0, .. m, are known, 
we define Zt as: 
(5.3) 
For periods after T+m, Zt is defined by 
m (5.4) Zt - 1.=0 WLV(Qnew I 0t-L-l)' t-T+m+l, 
t 
For time periods starting in T+l. and including T+m, Zt is a mixture of 
forecasts based on the old and new processes: 
(5.5) 
If this model of expectational change has explanatory power, a regression of 
the form 
13 
(5.6) 
should provide an explanation superior to one in which the Z's are based on the same 
expectational form throughout the sample. To allow for the presence of decision 
and other lags, we estimate 
3 (5.7) Et. - Ae + Lt-o Mei Zt.-k + DeKe + Uet., and 
3 
(5.8) Et. - Ag + Lt-o Mgi ~Zt.-k + DeKe + Ugt., 
which are the analogs to our equations (4.1) and (4.2). Only the equations for 
equipment were estimated because of the lack of data on new structures orders. 
In order to construct the variable Zt. we need equations for the laws of motion 
of output. There is a good deal of controversy today over whether output is a random 
walk or whether it reverts to a trend. Since the controversy has not yet been 
resolved, we use a simple form to represent output. An ARI(l,l) process was fitted 
for the period from 1947:1 to 1988:4, and then for the three subperiods 1947:1 to 
1973:3, 1973:4 to 1980:4, and 1981:1 to 1988:4. 14 The process was found to differ 
significantly	 over these subperiods. The estimated equations are: 
1947:1-1988:4 
1947:1-1973:3
 
1973:4-1980:4
 
1981:1-1988:4
 
14 These divisions of the sample period represent possible structural breaks 
or regime changes. They occur at the time of the OPEC boycott and at the Reagan 
inauguration. 
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The overall equation implies that output reverts to trend growth of $15.7 
billion (1982 dollars) per year, while the three equations for the 8ubperiods imply 
trend growth of $13.4 billion, $13.4 billion, and $22.2 billion respectively. 
To compute the variable Z, we also need a set of estimated weights, WL • We used 
the Department of Commerce's series on orders and shipments of producer capital 
goods. We estimated a fixed weight lag, and found the best results in terms of a 
minimum standard error were obtained with a polynomial distributed lag ranging up 
to 14 quarters. Thus, in equations (5.3) through (5.5), m equals 14. Half of the 
weight is on the current quarter and the first two lags, and three quarters of the 
orders are filled within five quarters. The mean lag is 3.47 quarters. 
Using equations (5.3) through (5.5) two versions of Zt were derived, one 
assuming a single regime for output and one assuming three regimes. 
The real rental price of capital services in the neoclassical model may be 
forecasted in a similar fashion. Instead of equations such as (5.3) through (5.5) 
in which the capital ratio is fixed, it can be made a function of expected c/p. We 
construct a term ZJ and define it as: 
14 e e 
(5.9) ZJ t - Lr.=o WL(Qt 0t-L-1)/( (c/p)t I 0t-L-1)· 
As in the case of output, we estimated autoregressive equations for the whole period 
and for three subperiods for c/p for equipment. The chosen specification was AR(2) 
and the estimated equations were: 
1947:1-1988:4 
(c/p)t - 0.01554 + 1.153l(c/p)t_1 - 0.1998(c/p)t_Z' 
-

1947:1-1973:3
 
(c/p)t - 0.01105 + 1.2154(c/ph_1 - 0.2483(c/p)t_Z'
 
15 
1973:4-1980:4 
(c/p)t- 0.02614 + 1.1245(c/p)t_l - 0.2148(c/p)t-2' and 
1981:1-1988:4 
(c/p)t - 0.03923 + 1.0734(c/ph_l - 0.1880(c/p)t_2' 
The parameters for the subperiods differ significantly by a likelihood ratio test. 
The equations imply that the equilibrium real rent for the whole period was about 
33.3 cents per year per dollars' worth of equipment, while for the subperiods it 
was 33.5 cents, 29.0 cents, and 34.2 cents, respectively. 
The equations estimated using ZJ are similar to (5.7) and (5.8), except that 
ZJ is substituted for Z, and we estimated the parameters A10 , All' M10 , M11 , D10 . and 
15D11' 
Turning to the choice of factor proportions in a putty-clay model, the si tuation 
seems much different. However, it may be shown that if certain conditions hold then 
the optimal amount of capital per unit of output capacity for equipment installed 
at time t should be proportional to pic at the time of installation. These 
conditions are that the firm is assumed to minimize the present value of total costs 
per unit of equipment, over the economic lifetime of that equipment, and to set the 
price of output as a markup on the present discounted value of average cost on the 
marginal vintage. We define: 
14 e e 
(5.10) ZBlt - LL=O WL [Qt I 0t-L-1 ]/[ (c/P)t-1 IOt-L-2]' 
14 e e 
(5.11) ZB2t - LL-O WL [Qt-11 0t-L-2] / [ (c/p) t-1 I0t-L-2]' and 
15 As earlier, all equations are estimated as first-order autoregressive 
processes and are adjusted for heteroskedasticity. As with the accelerator 
equations, for each version of the standard neoclassical model there is one equation 
which is fitted with one expectationa1 regime, and one equation fitted with three 
expectationa1 regimes. This also applies to the modified neoclassical equations 
below. 
16 
14 • •(5.12) ZB3t - Lt.-o WL ([Qt 0t-L-2] 1/[ (c/P)t-1 IOt-L-2]' 
Analogs to (5.7) using ZB1• and ZB2• and to (5.8) using ZB3 were developed. These in 
turn were estimated yielding the estimators A12 • A13 • M12 • N12 • M13 • D12 • and D13 • In 
additions a quasi-differences version was estimated which is given as: 
3 (5.13) Et - A14 + Lt-o M14k [ZB1t-k - (1- 6) ZB2t-k] + D14~ + U14t . 
The modified neoclassical equations were estimated using the same expectational 
scheme used throughout the sample (the one regime equations) and also with three 
sets of expectational schemes (the three regime equations). 
The results are given in Tables 3 and 4. As compared to Table I, the fits in 
Table 3 are slightly worse. Judging by the statistic sv' the modified neoclassical 
equations once again seem best among the expectational equations, although the 
differenced accelerators are close. The three regime equations fit no better than 
the one regime equations except in the case of the modified neoclassical equations, 
when judged by sv' However, regardless of the number of regimes t the differences and 
quasi-differences equations reported in Table 4 are all stable, while the levels 
equations all fail at least four tests. We are not certain what accounts for this 
stability, but it is possible that the Almon polynomial technique does not 
sufficiently constrain the lag distributions and that they shift about randomly from 
period to period. On the other hand, our combination of the orders-shipment lag plus 
the expectational lag apparently puts on sufficient constraints. 
The reasons why the levels versions of these equations failed the stability 
tests are not clear. One possibility is Hall's [1977] observation that investment 
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equations estimated in level form may really be savings equations and suffer from 
simultaneous equations bias. 
VI. Lag Distribution and Elasticities 
In this section we report the results of several dynamic simulations of 
equations we have fitted above. We simulate the effects of various permanent shocks 
on the path of the predicted values in each equation. 
In the case of the expectational equations, in order to be consistent in our 
treatment of expectations and to avoid the critique of Lucas, when simulating a 
permanent shock we should adjust the expectational equation to reflect the assumed 
path of the shocked variable. At this point, we avoid the necessity for doing this 
by simulating a small shock so that the change in the expectational equation is 
negligible. 
We report simulations only for the traditional standard neoclassical equation 
for equipment and two versions of the expectational modified neoclassical equipment 
equation. According to the traditional standard neoclassical equipment equation in 
differences form, when simulated with a permanent change in real rental price 
starting in the first quarter of 1981, the maximum (in absolute terms) elasticity 
of investment is -0.40. This occurs in the sixth-quarter after the shock (see the 
left-most column of Table 5). The response over-shoots and by the seventeenth 
quarter, the elasticity is positive. It remains positive for four quarters, then 
settles down in the neighborhood of -0.15, which is the elasticity after eight years. 
The eight year elasticity of the capital stock with respect to the rental price is 
about -0.12. The elasticities for a change in output are of the same magnitude but 
of opposite signs. 
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The modified neoclassical three regime equation in differences form is the best­
fitting expectational equation. The responses in this equation to shocks were 
computed but are not shown. Using this model, the output elasticity of investment 
rises to 1.59 after four quarters and settles down to about 0.49 after eight years. 
However, the rental price elasticity is positive for the first eight quarters of non­
zero response, and even when it becomes negative it never rises above 0.08 in 
absolute value during the first eight years. After eight years the stock of 
equipment is only 0.04% higher for each 1% drop in the real rental price. The 
response in the first eight quarters may be explained by noting that all relative 
price effects are forced to act multiplicatively with the change in output. With 
several negative output changes in the 1981-82 recession, the equation is forced to 
predict that a fall in the rental price of capital services will increase the capital 
intensity of disinvestment which means lower, not higher investment. But this is 
a defect of that specific model, not a reflection of the real world. A more 
attractive specification is the modified neoclassical quasi-differences version. 
The second and third columns of Table 5 report on the simulation of the 
expectational modified neoclassical three regime equipment equation in quasi­
differences form. The output elasticity peaks at 1.50 in the fourth quarter, and 
settles down near 0.73 after eight years. The real rental price elasticity is always 
negative and builds gradually to -0.32 after eight years. Eight years after a 
negative shock of 1% in the real rental price, the stock of equipment has risen by 
0.21 percent. 
An elasticity of -0.32 is much smaller in absolute terms than the theoretical 
elasticity in the Cobb-Douglas model of minus one. Our results are in fact much 
smaller than some earlier resu1 ts, but higher than others. Hall and Jorgenson [1971] 
and Bischoff [197la] simulated equipment spending under the assumption that the 
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investment tax credit had never been adopted. Hall and Jorgenson found that in this 
case equipment spending would have been 10.0% lower in 1966, while Bischoff found 
it would have been 8.8% lower in 1966:4. Our simulation found spending would have 
been 4.2% lower for all of 1966, and 4.3% lower in the fourth quarter. All of these 
simulations involved single equations only. 
Chirinko and Eisner [1983] used six leading large-scale macroeconometric models 
to simulate a doubling of the investment tax credit for equipment to 14% in 1973 and 
20% in 1975 and thereafter. They carried out both single equation and full model 
simulations. Because we do not have a full model, we compare only single equation 
simulations. Using the original models, the simulated results ranged from an 
increase in investment in 1977:4 of 1.5% (Michigan) to 14.2% for DRI and 15.1% for 
MPS, with an average of 8.4%. After Chirinko and Eisner made various adjustments 
which seemed reasonable to them, the results were dramatically lower, with the 
response ranging from 1.7% to 8.6% and a mean response of 3.7%. The authors 
emphasized that there was now a consensus: Chase, DRI, MPS, and Wharton all 
predicted between 2.8% and 3.1%. 
Our results show an increase of 6.8%, more than double the revised Chirinko­
Eisner consensus. and below three of their six original models but above their 
remaining three. 
VII. Policy Analysis 
Traditionally, policy analysis has been carried out by computing a baseline 
simulation and then a second simulation with one or more policy parameters changed. 
The difference in results is attributed to a policy change. Some policy analysis 
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of this sort is criticized by Lucas [1976]. In one of our simulations below, we 
attempt to respond this point. We also report traditional simulations. 
Using the traditional standard neoclassical equipment equation in differences 
form, we compare a simulation of the path of equipment spending under the assumption 
that none of the Reagan tax changes took place, to a simulation with all the actual 
changes (see the fourth column in Table 5). 
We also compare two similar simulations using the expectationa1 modified 
neoclassical three regime equipment equation in quasi-differences form (see the fifth 
column, Table 5). In this case, the expectationa1 parameters for the counterfactua1 
case are held at their values computed using the actual policies. Since the tax 
parameter changes are large in this simulation, the counterfactua1 case is based on 
inconsistent expectations. 
In the sixth column of Table 5, we report the use of the same equation but with 
a change in the expectationa1 equation for the real rental prices to the 
counterfactua1 case. The equation we use, fitted to counterfactua1 data for 1981:1 
to 1988:4 is: 
(c/p)t - 0.02365 + 1.3525(c/p)t_l - 0.4223(c/p)t_2' 
According to the standard neoclassical equipment equation in differences form, 
we calculate that, between 1981 and 1985, the tax changes led to increase in 
investment totalling about $7.3 billion (1982 dollars). In the subsequent three 
years, this equation indicates that equipment investment was reduced by $23.5 
billion. The net effect is to reduce the stock of equipment at the beginning of 1989 
by $17.6 billion, or about one percent. Because this equation indicates a tendency 
to overshoot, investment is predicted to be lower between 1984:1 and 1985:4 than it 
would have been in the absence of the policy. Also, the response between 1986:3 and ­
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1988:2 to the repeal of the investment tax credit and the depreciation change is 
large and rapid. 
The modified neoclassical expectational three regime equipment equation in 
quasi-differences form presents a more gradual response to the tax policy changes. 
This is so whether it is simulated with inconsistent or consistent expectations. 
In the latter version, the response between 1981 and 1985 is about $10.6 billion 
(1982 dollars). The reduction between 1986 and 1988 is only $6.4 billion. The 
effect on the stock of equipment in 1989 is only -$1.0 billion or less than one­
tenth of one percent. 
Because the absolute value of the long-run rental price elasticity for the 
modified neoclassical equation simulated here appears to be higher than the similar 
elasticity for the standard neoclassical equation, the long-run negative response 
of investment and of capital stock from all of the Reagan tax policies together 
should be projected to be larger under the modified neoclassical equation. Since 
the real rental price is calculated to have increased about three percent, as a 
resul t of these policies, the eight year elasticities suggest an effect on investment 
and capital stock of less than one percent. 
The results using consistent expectations are not much different from the 
results using the same equation with inconsistent expectations. This is not 
surprising, since the coefficients of the two fitted regressions for the real rental 
price for the period 1981 to 1988 do not differ significantly by conventional 
statistical standards. 
-
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VIII. Conclusions 
In this paper we have presented evidence supporting the proposition that 
traditional models of business investment in equipment and structures suffer from 
parameter instability, as predicted by the Lucas Critique. We have also developed 
new expectational models of equipment spending which, in differences form, appear 
to have stable parameters. 
Thus, our new model of expectations and investment, in the differences and 
quasi-differences forms, seems to be promising for future research. The 
expectational version of the modified neoclassical equipment equation, in quasi­
differences form, seems slightly superior to the corresponding accelerator equation. 
The expectational modified neoclassical equation appears useful for future research 
into tax policy effects on investment. 
As for the direct effects of the Reagan tax policies on equipment investment, 
the net effects are calculated to be small, because the policies cancelled each other 
out. Nevertheless, the stable equations simulated indicate that a sustained tax 
policy can have substantial effect, either positive or negative, on equipment 
investment. 
•
 
•
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Table 1. Summary Statistics, Traditional Equations. 
Equation 
a 
S 
e 
b 
S 
v 
-2R Log of Likelihood 
Function 
Durbin Watson 
Statistic 
c 
Rho 
Equipment 
Accelerator 
Levels 
Differences 
.17 
.17 
.35 
.37 
.98 
.98 
914 
912 
1.92 
2.06 
.87 
.88 
Standard Neoclassical 
Levels 
Differences 
.19 
.19 
.47 
.51 
.97 
.97 
902 
900 
1. 68 
1. 56 
.92 
.93 
"" 0' 
Modified Neoclassical 
Levels 
Differences 
Quasi-differences 
Structures 
Accelerator 
Levels 
Differences 
.16 
.17 
.18 
.11 
.11 
.24 
.26 
.38 
.46 
.43 
.98 
.98 
.98 
.96 
.95 
923 
917 
912 
977 
972 
1.92 
1. 99 
1.94 
1. 67 
1. 58 
.74 
.77 
.89 
.97 
.96 
Standard Neoclassical 
Levels 
Differences 
.11 
.11 
.49 
.49 
.96 
.96 
976 
979 
1. 58 
1.62 
.97 
.97 
Modified Neoclassical 
Levels 
Differences 
.11 
.11 
.49 
.50 
.96 
.96 
978 
979 
1. 61 
1. 65 . 
.97 
.98 
8	 Estimate of standard deviation of white noise error e, measured in fractions of one percent of Rnatura1" real 
GNP. 
b	 Estimate of standard deviation of autocorre1ated error v, measured in fractions of one percent of "natural" 
real GNP. 
c	 Estimated autocorrelation coefficient of errors u. 
. 
Table 2. Tests of Stability, Traditional Equations, Calculated Chi-Square Values. 
Equation Period 1a Period 6 Period 5 
vs vs vs vs vs vs 
2 & 3 4 & 5 4,7 & 8 6 & 8 4 & 7 7 & 8 
Equipment 
Accelerator 
Levels 
Differences 
23.1 
l3.1b 
19.0 
11.5b 
52.5 
41.9 
31.6 
18.2 
20.9 
23.7 
33.4 
30.4 
Standard Neoclassical 
Levels 
Differences 
25.3 
5.9b 
30.8 
9.0b 
36.8 
15.2b 
10.5b 
3.5b 
26.3 
11.7b 
6.0b 
6.2b 
Modified Neoclassical 
Levels 
Differences 
Quasi-Differences 
27.7 
6.6b 
22.6 
31. 7 
5.6b 
22.9 
65.9 
38.4 
42.9 
25.0 
18.3 
22.8 
40.9 
20.1 
20.2 
40.1 
32.8 
20.0 
~ Structures 
Accelerator 
Levels 
Differences 
11.1b 
9.1b 
12.6b 
11.9b 
54.6 
25.0b 
34.0 
22.4 
20.6 
2.6b 
42.0 
l3.0b 
Standard Neoclassical 
Levels 
Differences 
16.8 
15.1b 
23.4 
16.8 
50.9 
70.8 
36.3 
52.4 
14.6b 
18.5 
27.5 
54.0 
Modified Neoclassical 
Levels 
Differences 
17.4 
14.2b 
24.6 
16.5 
49.2 
50.4 
36.8 
38.2 
12.4b 
12.2b 
24.6 
33.9 
a Period 1 
Period 2 
Period 3 
- 1953:1 
. 1953:1 
- 1971:1 
through 1988:4; 
through 1970:4; 
through 1988:4; 
Period 4 
Period 5 
Period 6 
- 1953:1 through 1973:3; 
- 1973:4 through 1988:4; 
- 1953:1 through 1980:4; 
Period 7 -
Period 8­
1973:4 through 1980:4; 
1981:1 through 1988:4. 
b The null hypothesis (parameter stability) is not rejected at the 0.05 level. 
Table 3. Summary Statistics, Expectational Equations, Equipment. 
Equation 
a 
S 
e 
b 
S 
v 
-2R Log of Likelihood 
Function 
Durbin Watson 
Statistic 
c 
Rho 
Accelerator 
Levels 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
.18 
.18 
.81 
.83 
.98 
.98 
908 
910 
1. 94 
1. 96 
.98 
.98 
Differences 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
.18 
.18 
.42 
.42 
.98 
.98 
905 
906 
1.83 
1. 83 
.90 
.90 
Standard Neoclassical 
Levels 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
.20 
.20 
.59 
.60 
.97 
.97 
894 
894 
1. 39 
1. 39 
.94 
.94 
~ 
CD 
Differences 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
.20 
.20 
.53 
.52 
.97 
.97 
892 
892 
1. 32 
1. 33 
.92 
.92 
Modified Neoclassical 
Levels 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
.18 
.17 
.38 
.37 
.98 
.98 
913 
915 
1. 74 
1. 76 
.88 
.88 
Differences 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
.18 
.18 
.41 
.40 
.98 
.98 
904 
906 
1. 79 
1. 81 
.89 
.89 
Quasi-Differences 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
.18 
.18 
.41 
.41 
.98 
.98 
906 
908 
1. 80 
1. 83 
.90 
.90 
See Table 1 for definition of notes. 
Table 4. Tests of Stability, Expectationa1 Equations, Equipment, Calculated Chi-Square Values. 
Equation 
vs 
2 & 3 
vs 
4 & 5 
Period 18 
vs 
4,7 & 8 
vs 
6 & 8 
Period 6 
vs 
4 & 7 
Period 5 
vs 
7 & 8 
Accelerator 
Levels 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
25.5 
23.4 
20.2 
19.5 
29.1 
50.6 
12.3b 
9.1b 
16.8 
41. 5 
8.8b 
31.1 
Differences 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
5.8b 
5.0b 
5.4b 
4.6b 
11.9b 
9.0b 
5.1b 
2.2b 
6.8b 
6.8b 
6.5b 
4.4b 
Standard Neoclassical 
Levels 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
22.4 
21. 8 
28.5 
28.2 
32.3 
32.6 
6.2b 
7.3b 
26.2 
25.3 
3.9b 
4.5b 
"-J 
\D Differences 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
4.6b 
3.8b 
1. 9b 
1.6b 
3.4b 
3.4b 
1.5b 
2.0b 
1. 9b 
1.5b 
1.5b 
1.8b 
Modified Neoclassical 
Levels 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
27.7 
26.9 
31.0 
30.4 
44.8 
39.8 
1l.lb 
7.0b 
33.1 
32.9 
13 .8b 
9.4b 
Differences 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
5.8b 
5.3b 
6.4b 
5.8b 
17.0b 
12.3b 
7.7b 
3.6b 
9.4b 
8.7b , 
10.6b 
6.5b 
Quasi-Differences 
1 Regime 
3 Regimes 
9.8b 
9.8b 
12.9b 
13.0b 
23.2b 
20.9b 
8.8b 
7.3b 
14.4b 
13.6b 
10.3b 
7.9b 
See Table 2 for definition of notes. 
Table 5. Simulation Results. 
Simulated Effects of Reagan Tax Po1icies* 
Simulation Elasticities Quarterly Flow, Billions of 1982 Dollars at Annual Rates 
Period I II III IV V VI 
1981:1 - ,00 .00 - .00 0.0 0.0 0,0 
1982:1 -.38 1. 37 - .06 6.7 1.1 1.4 
1983:1 -.36 .62 - .12 3,3 1.4 2,4 
1984:1 -,17 .78 -.22 -0.4 2,2 2,2 
1985:1 .005 .67 -.24 -2.3 2.6 3,6 
1986:1 -.08 .65 -.26 1.1 2.8 2.9 
1987:1 -.14 .68 -.27 -11,5 0.0 -1.0 
1988:1 - .15 .71 -.31 -11. 6 -4.0 -5,9 
1988:4 - .15 ,73 -.32 -1. 9 -2.2 -4,0 
I. Simulation results of a permanent equipment rental price shock on producers' durable equipment, traditional 
equation, standard neoclassical model, differences. Elasticity with respect to output shocks is the same with 
opposite sign. 
w 
o II, Simulation results of 
expectationa1 equation, 
a permanent output shock on producers' 
three regimes, quasi-differences. 
durable equipment, modified neoclassical 
III. Simulation results of a permanent equipment rental price shock on 
neoclassical expectationa1 model, three regimes, quasi-differences. 
producers' durable equipment, modified 
IV, Differences between a simulation with Reagan tax parameters and a simulation with all tax parameters held at 
1980:4 levels on producers' durable equipment, traditional equation, standard neoclassical model, differences, 
V, Differences between a simulation with Reagan tax parameters and a simulation with all tax parameters held at 
1980:4 levels on producers' durable equipment, expectationa1 equation, modified neoc1assic~1 model, three 
regimes, quasi-differences (constant tax simulation based on inconsistent expectations), 
VI. Differences between a simulation with Reagan tax parameters and a simulation with all tax parameters held at 
1980:4 levels on producers' durable equipment, expectationa1 equation, modified neoclassical model three 
regimes, quasi-differences (constant tax simulation based on consistent expectations). 
* Positive sign indicates Reagan simulation higher. 
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